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Abstract— We propose an information theoretic framework
for the secure two-party function computation (SFC) problem
and introduce the notion of SFC capacity. We study and extend
string oblivious transfer (OT) to sample-wise OT. We propose an
efficient, perfectly private OT protocol utilizing the binary erasure
channel or source. We also propose the bootstrap string OT proto-
col which provides disjoint (weakened) privacy while achieving a
multiplicative increase in rate, thus trading off security for rate.
Finally, leveraging our OT protocol, we construct a protocol for
SFC and establish a general lower bound on SFC capacity of the
binary erasure channel and source.
I. INTRODUCTION
Motivated by applications ranging from confidential
database access to oblivious contract negotiation [1], we study
the problem of secure two-party function computation (SFC).
In this problem, Alice and Bob each have private data, and
they wish to compute functions of both of their data. The
objective is to design a protocol that ensures correctness of
the computed functions while maintaining individual privacy,
in the sense that neither party gains any information about the
other’s data other than what can be inferred from the result of
their function computation. An important special case of this
problem is string oblivious transfer (OT) from [2], wherein
Alice has two strings A˜0 and A˜1 and Bob has a single bit B.
An OT protocol should reveal A˜B to Bob, while Alice remains
ignorant of B and Bob of A˜(1−B).
In this work, we propose an information theoretic frame-
work for SFC and introduce the notion of SFC rates and
capacity, in terms of the ratio of samples of computation to
samples of correlated randomness needed. Correlated random-
ness is a noisy resource in the form of a noisy communication
channel or distributed random source available between the
parties. We cast the string OT problem as a special case
within our framework and also introduce the sample-wise OT
problem. We address the string and sample-wise OT problems
with an efficient perfectly private protocol utilizing the binary
erasure channel or source. For the string OT problem, we
also propose the bootstrap protocol which provides disjoint
(weakened) privacy while achieving a multiplicative increase
in rate, thus trading off security for rate. Finally, leveraging
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our OT protocol, we construct a protocol for SFC and establish
a general lower bound on SFC capacity binary erasure channel
and source. Due to space limitations, detailed proofs are
omitted, but will appear in an extended version of this work.
Our objective is information theoretic (unconditional) secu-
rity, where even computationally unbounded adversaries must
not be able to break the privacy. We work with the assumption
of semi-honest (or passive) parties, where the parties honestly
follow the protocol. It is well-known that in this setting both
OT and SFC cannot be realized “from scratch” [3], [4], that is
with protocols using only noise-free communication channels
and local randomness. It has been observed that OT becomes
possible given correlated randomness [5], [6], [7], [8], and that
SFC also becomes possible based on OT [3]. Thus, correlated
randomness is a valuable resource as an enabling factor for OT
and SFC. Recently the concept of OT capacity of a channel
or source, measuring the fundamental limit of how efficiently
the resource can be used toward OT, has been introduced in
[9], [7] and further characterized by [8], [10].
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first formulate the SFC problem within
a novel information theoretic framework. This framework uti-
lizes conditional mutual information based privacy measures,
and defines achievable function computation rate and capacity.
We then discuss OT which is encompassed by this SFC
framework as a special case. In the last subsection we present
the problem of string OT with the notion of disjoint privacy.
A. Secure Two-Party Function Computation
Two parties, Alice and Bob, each have k samples of a
jointly distributed source on the finite alphabets A×B, where
Alice possesses Ak , {A1, . . . , Ak} ∈ Ak and Bob possesses
Bk , {B1, . . . , Bk} ∈ B
k
, with (Ak, Bk) ∼ PAk,Bk .
For a given function f : A × B → Rf , Alice wishes
to compute samples of a function of the sources F k ,
{f(A1, B1), . . . , f(Ak, Bk)}. Similarly, Bob wishes to com-
pute Gk , {g(A1, B1), . . . , g(Ak, Bk)} where g : A × B →
Rg . Alice and Bob cooperatively compute these functions
via an interactive protocol that may exchange messages over
an error-free discussion channel and also utilize n samples
of correlated randomness. The correlated randomness is a
precious resource which comes in two possible forms:
• Source-model: For i = 1, . . . , n, (Xi, Yi)
iid
∼ PX,Y .
Xn , (X1, . . . , Xn) is available to Alice and Y n ,
(Y1, . . . , Yn) to Bob.
• Channel-model: Xn and Y n are respectively the se-
quence of inputs and outputs of a discrete memoryless
channel (DMC) with conditional distribution PY |X , with
Xn selected by Alice and Y n received by Bob.
An acceptable (n, k)-protocol for source-model correlated
randomness is defined as follows. First, Alice and Bob receive
(Ak, Xn) and (Bk, Y n), and generate local random variables
ZA and ZB respectively, where ZA, ZB , (Ak, Bk), and
(Xn, Y n) are mutually independent. Then, over r stages, Alice
and Bob exchange messages M1, . . . ,Mr over the error-free
discussion channel, where in an odd numbered stage i Alice
produces message Mi as a function of everything available to
her, namely (Ak, Xn, ZA,M i−1), and in an even numbered
stage j Bob produces the messages Mj as a function of
everything available to him, namely (Bk, Y n, ZB,M i−1). At
the end of the protocol, Alice and Bob produce function
estimates Fˆ k and Gˆk as functions of (Ak, Xn, ZA,M r) and
(Bk, Y n, ZB,M
r) respectively.
An acceptable (n, k)-protocol for channel-model correlated
randomness is similar to the source-model protocol, but
(Xn, Y n) are not given at the beginning of the protocol.
Instead, the samples Xn are generated by Alice, transmitted
into the DMC, and outputs Y n are received by Bob. The DMC
transmissions may be arbitrarily interspersed with discussion
stages (including happening entirely before or after the discus-
sion messages are exchanged). At each stage or transmission,
the discussion message or channel input symbol is a function
of everything available to the sending party. A source-model
protocol can be realized as a special case of the channel-model
if Alice randomizes the inputs, for i = 1, . . . , n, Xi
iid
∼ PX ,
and transmits before any discussion messages are sent.
For both models, R > 0 is a called an achievable SFC rate
for the particular sources, functions, and correlated random-
ness if for every ǫ > 0, and all sufficiently large n, there exists
an acceptable (n, k)-protocol with (k/n) > R − ǫ satisfying
the following
• (Correctness) Pr[Fˆ k 6= F k] < ǫ and Pr[Gˆk 6= Gk] < ǫ,
• (Privacy for Alice)
I(Ak;ZB, Y
n,M r|Bk, Gk) < ǫ, (1)
• (Privacy for Bob)
I(Bk;ZA, X
n,M r|Ak, F k) < ǫ. (2)
A protocol is said to be perfectly private if the privacy con-
straints of (1) and (2) are exactly zero. The SFC capacity C for
the particular sources, functions, and correlated randomness is
defined as the largest achievable function computation rate,
and 0 if no rate R > 0 is achievable.
B. Sample-wise Oblivious Transfer
The 1-out-of-m sample-wise OT problem is a special case
of the SFC problem, wherein Alice’s source alphabet is A =
{0, 1}m, Bob’s source alphabet is B = {1, . . . ,m}, Alice’s
function is constant f = 0, and Bob’s function is given by
g((a1, . . . , am), b) = ab. For clarity of exposition, let A be
the k×m binary matrix formed by vertically stacking Alice’s
m-bit samples A1, . . . , Ak as the rows. Bob wishes to receive
the k bits G1, . . . , Gk, where Gi = Ai,Bi . Alice’s privacy
condition (1) means that Bob obtains no information about the
other k(m− 1) bits of A that he did not select. Bob’s privacy
condition (2) means that Alice obtains no information about
Bob’s selection Bk. When dealing with the above scenario,
we speak of achievable sample-wise OT rate ROT,m, and the
sample-wise OT capacity COT,m.
C. String Oblivious Transfer with Disjoint Privacy
The 1-out-of-m string OT problem is a special case of
the 1-out-of-m sample-wise OT problem, wherein the source
distribution is specified as
PAk,Bk(a
k, bk) =
{
1
m2km , if b1 = . . . = bk
0, otherwise,
that is, Alice’s source samples Ak consist of km iid Bernoulli-
(1/2) bits and is independent of Bob’s source Bk which
always consists of identical samples uniformly distributed over
B = {1, . . . ,m}. Interpreting this scenario, Alice has m, k-bit
strings A˜1, . . . , A˜m, which are aligned as the columns of A,
and Bob has the selection B , B1 and wishes to receive the
k-bit string A˜B .
Alice’s privacy condition (1) reduces to
I({A˜i}
k
i=1,i6=B;ZB, Y
n,M r|B, A˜B) < ǫ,
which implies that Bob is unable to reconstruct any string
that he did not select or any non-trivial joint function of the
strings that he did not select without non-negligible probability
of error. The interesting alternative notion of disjoint privacy
replaces Alice’s privacy condition (1) with
for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, I(A˜i;ZB, Y n,M r|B, A˜B) < ǫ, (3)
which implies that Bob is unable to reconstruct any non-trivial
function of any individual string (including the string itself)
that he did not select without non-negligible probability of
error. A protocol that satisfies (1) will also satisfy this disjoint
privacy condition (3), however the converse is not true. For
example, a protocol that reveals to Bob A˜B and also the
binary exclusive-or (XOR) all of the strings A˜1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ A˜m
will satisfy the disjoint privacy constraint, but will not satisfy
(1). A protocol obtains perfect disjoint privacy if the privacy
constraints of (3) are exactly zero.
The motivation for considering the weakened sense of
disjoint privacy is to explore protocols (see Section IV) that
tradeoff privacy in order to achieve higher rates than the
sample-wise OT protocol of Section III-A. When dealing with
the above scenario with the disjoint privacy condition (3)
replacing Alice’s standard privacy condition (1), we speak of
achievable string OT rate with disjoint privacy R˜OT,m, and
string OT capacity with disjoint privacy C˜OT,m.
III. SAMPLE-WISE OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER
In this section, we present the sample-wise oblivious trans-
fer (SWOT) protocol. Later on, by leveraging the SWOT
protocol, we construct protocols for string OT with disjoint
privacy (see Section IV-A) and for SFC (see Section V-A).
The SWOT protocol utilizes correlated randomness in form
of the binary erasure channel (BEC) and the binary erasure
source (BES). The BEC(p) has the input and output alpha-
bets X = {0, 1} and Y = {0, 1, e}, with the conditional
distribution PY |X(y|x) = p1(y=e) + (1 − p)1(y=x), where
p is the the probability of erasure. The BES(p) has the joint
distribution PX,Y (x, y) = (1/2)PY |X(y|x). The protocol will
be described as a source-model protocol for the BES(p), which
is easily adapted into a channel-model protocol for the BEC(p)
by adding the initial step of Alice transmitting n iid Bernoulli-
(1/2) bits into the BEC in order to simulate n samples of
a BES. Because of the interchangeability of the BEC and
BES, we will write BES/BEC(p) to denote that the correlated
randomness is either the BEC(p) or BES(p).
A. Sample-wise Oblivious Transfer Protocol
This protocol is inspired by the protocols for the binary
erasure channel given by [8], [9]. The novel aspects of our
protocol are the treatment of sample-wise as opposed to string
oblivious transfer and the mechanism of failing into an error
case when privacy cannot be provided. This yields a perfectly
private protocol with roughly the same negligible probability
of error, and also simplifies analysis of both privacy and
error. The perfect privacy of this protocol is important since
it enables it to be leveraged in a secure black-box manner to
construct other protocols without complicating the analysis of
privacy. The basic idea of this protocol is to use the erasures
of the BES/BEC to conceal the k(m− 1) bits at the locations
in A that Bob must remain ignorant of, while using the non-
erasures to reveal the k bits at the locations in A that Bob has
selected.
• Bob partitions {1, . . . , n} into the set of locations of
erasures Se and locations of non-erasures S in Y n, that
is, Yi = e if and only if i ∈ Se, and S = {1, . . . , n}\Se.
• If there is not enough erasures or non-erasures, k > |S|
or k(m − 1) > |Se|, then the protocol aborts and Bob
sets his function estimate to Gˆk = 0k.
• Otherwise, the protocol continues and Bob creates an
k×m matrix U, where at each of the k positions specified
by {(i, Bi) : i = 1, . . . , k}, a random, uniform selection,
without replacement, from S is placed. Similarly, at the
other k(m − 1) positions, a random selection from Se
is placed. Bob sends the matrix U to Alice via the
discussion channel.
• The k × m matrix U, whose elements belong to
{1, . . . , n} specifies how Alice should arrange km of
the n bits Xn into the k × m binary matrix XU, via
XU(i, j) = XU(i,j). Alice computes C = A
⊕
XU,
where
⊕
denotes element-wise binary exclusive-or
(XOR), and sends C to Bob over the discussion channel.
• Bob is able create his function estimate Gˆk by reversing
the XOR since YU is equal to XU at locations corre-
sponding to the locations of A that he has selected.
B. Analysis and Achievable Rates
The SWOT protocol is perfectly private for Bob since any
U is uniformly possible given any realization of Bob’s samples
Bk because erasures uniformly and independently occur in
Y n. The protocol is perfectly private for Alice since C is
only sent to Bob if the protocol does not abort and there have
been enough erased bits, acting as a Bernoulli-(1/2) one-time
pad, to mask the k(m− 1) bits that should be concealed. The
protocol is correct if it does not abort, thus the probability of
error is bounded by the probability of aborting, which becomes
negligible for n sufficiently large if k < n(1 − p) = E|S|
and k(m − 1) < np = E|Se|, by the law of large numbers.
Thus, the rate ROT,m = min((1−p), p/(m−1)) is achievable
by this protocol. This protocol is distribution-free since the
above arguments hold not only for any distribution, but also
for any realization of the sources (Ak, Bk). These results are
summarized in the following theorem
Theorem 3.1: For any arbitrary source distribution PAk,Bk ,
the SWOT protocol, utilizing correlated randomness in the
form a BES/BEC(p), obtains perfect privacy and achieves the
1-out-of-m sample-wise OT rate
ROT,m = min((1− p), p/(m− 1)).
Hence, the 1-out-of-m sample-wise OT capacity for a
BES/BEC(p) and for arbitrary source distributions is bounded
below by
COT,m ≥ ROT,m = min((1− p), p/(m− 1)).
An upper bound to the sample-wise OT capacity for general
correlated randomness is established by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2: For the uniform source distribution and gen-
eral source-model correlated randomness, we have
COT,m ≤ min(I(X ;Y ), H(X |Y )/(m− 1)).
For channel-model correlated randomness, the right side of the
above expression is maximized over PX .
The proof of this theorem is omitted due to space limi-
tations. It follows from the methods and results used in [8,
Theorem 1] and [9, Lemma 7].
For the BES(p), H(X |Y ) = p and I(X ;Y ) = 1 − p.
For the BEC(p), maxPX min(I(X ;Y ), H(X |Y )/(m− 1)) =
min((1 − p), p/(m − 1)) with the maximum achieved by
PX = (1/2). Thus, the capacity upper bound of Theorem 3.2
matches the capacity lower bound of Theorem 3.1, implying
the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1: The 1-out-of-m sample-wise OT capacity
for the uniform source distribution and correlated randomness
in the form of a BES/BEC(p) is given by
COT,m = min((1 − p), p/(m− 1)).
The SWOT protocol achieves capacity.
Fig. 1. The encoding tree structure for the BOOT protocol for 1-out-of-6
string OT, with parameters u = 2, s1 = 2 and s2 = 3.
Note that this capacity is maximized at C = (1/m) for
the erasure probability p∗ = (m − 1)/m, where the ratio of
erasures to non-erasures matches the ratio of bits concealed to
bits revealed. The SWOT protocol achieves capacity since it
efficiently utilizes the erasures and non-erasures in revealing
and concealing the appropriate bits.
IV. STRING OT WITH DISJOINT PRIVACY
The bootstrap OT (BOOT) protocol addresses the prob-
lem of string OT with the disjoint privacy condition (3).
The SWOT protocol could also be applied to this problem,
yielding the achievable rate given in Theorem 3.1 with the
stronger sense of joint privacy (1). However, the BOOT
protocol achieves rates that are better by a factor up to
((m−1)/⌈log2m⌉) (when the probability of erasure p ≤ 1/2)
since it provides only disjoint privacy.
A. Bootstrap String Oblivious Transfer Protocol
The BOOT protocol for 1-out-of-m string OT is param-
eterized by a finite sequence of u integers, s1, . . . , su ∈
{2, . . . ,m}, such that
∏u
i=1 si ≥ m. The BOOT protocol
leverages u uses of the SWOT protocol, where the i-th usage
is for 1-out-of-si OT. For i = 1, . . . , u, Alice generates si,
independent k-bit Bernoulli-(1/2) masking strings {Z˜i,j}sij=1.
The basic idea is to encode each one of Alice’s strings with
the XOR of a different combination of u of these masking
strings, taking one from each set {Z˜i,j}sij=1 for i = 1, . . . , u.
Alice first sends these encodings, denoted by C˜1, . . . , C˜m, to
Bob over the discussion channel. Then, for Bob to decode a
particular string of Alice’s, Alice and Bob perform u oblivious
transfers where in the i-th OT Bob chooses from {Z˜i,j}sij=1
the masking string that is part of the combination masking
the string of Alice’s that he wants. The method in which each
string of Alice is assigned a unique combination of masking
strings can be visualized by a tree structure.
The encoding tree structure for the example of 1-out-of-6
string OT via the BOOT protocol with parameters u = 2,
s1 = 2 and s2 = 3 is illustrated in Figure 1. In this example,
if Bob wishes to obtain A˜3, he would select Z˜1,1 in first round
of OT and then select Z˜2,3 in second round of OT, allowing
him to reconstruct A˜3 via C˜3 ⊕ Z˜1,1 ⊕ Z˜2,3.
B. Analysis and Achievable Rates
The perfect privacy of the SWOT protocol guarantees that
Bob only learns the particular combination of masking strings
Z˜i,j that he selected, however, by the structure of the encoding,
its possible for Bob to learn some information about Alice’s
strings beyond just the knowledge of A˜B . However, Bob will
not be able to determine the specific value of any particular
string A˜i for i 6= B. Consider the example of 1-out-of-6 string
OT illustrated in Figure 1 for B = 3. Since Bob learns Z˜1,1
and Z˜2,3, he can also determine certain joint functions of
Alice’s strings such as A˜1 ⊕ A˜4 ⊕ A˜6, which can be found
from C˜1 ⊕ C˜4 ⊕ C˜6 ⊕ Z˜1,1 ⊕ Z˜2,3. Note that however, Bob
cannot reduce any of the equations further to determine the
value of any A˜i for i 6= 3. The proof for the general situation
is omitted due to space limitations.
The correctness of the protocol follows if each of the
u usages of the SWOT protocol is correct, which happens
if there is enough erasures and non-erasures in BES/BEC
samples in each usage. Note that instead, all of the BES/BEC
samples can be taken at the beginning, with the erasures
and non-erasures being allocated to multiple usages if they
are sufficient, which will happen with high probability for n
sufficiently large provided that k/n is slightly less than the
achievable rate determined by the following rate analysis.
For each round i = 1, . . . , u, the SWOT protocol for 1-
out-of-si OT of k-bit strings requires asymptotically ni =
k/ROT,si samples of the BES/BEC. The total number of sam-
ples of BES/BEC needed is n =
∑u
i=1 ni =
∑u
i=1 k/ROT,si .
Thus, the asymptotic rate achieved by this protocol is given
by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1: Let s1, . . . , su ∈ {2, . . . ,m} be a finite
sequence of integers such that
∏u
i=1 si ≥ m. Then, the BOOT
protocol with parameters (s1, . . . , su) for a BES/BEC(p)
obtains perfect disjoint privacy and achieves the string OT
rate
R˜OT,m =
(
u∑
i=1
1
ROT,si
)−1
,
where ROT,s = min((1 − p), p/(s − 1)) is the achievable
sample-wise OT rate for the BES/BEC(p) from Theorem 3.1.
Hence, the string OT capacity (with disjoint privacy) is
bounded below by
C˜OT,m ≥ max
u,s1,...,su
(
u∑
i=1
1
ROT,si
)−1
,
where the maximization is taken over the set of finite
sequences of integers s1, . . . , su ∈ {2, . . . ,m} such that∏u
i=1 si ≥ m.
The SWOT protocol is most efficient for erasure probability
p∗ = (m−1)/m, since it needs a large proportion of erasures
to fully conceal the k(m − 1) bits that Bob did not select.
The best erasure probability for the BOOT protocol, however,
is variable and depends on the choice of parameters. For
example, setting u = ⌈log2m⌉ and si = 2 for all i, yields
the achievable rate
R˜OT,m =
ROT,2
⌈log2m⌉
=
min(p, (1− p))
⌈log2m⌉
,
which is maximized at R˜OT,m = 1/(2⌈log2m⌉) for p =
(1/2). Comparing this to the achievable sample-wise OT
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
Achievable Rates for Bootstrap 1−out−of−10 OT
Erasure probability, p
Ac
hi
ev
ab
le
 ra
te
s = 2,2,2,2
s = 2,2,3
s = 3,4
s = 2,5
s = 10
Fig. 2. Achievable rates of the BOOT protocol for 1-out-of-10 string OT as
a function of erasure probability p of the BES/BEC(p). Each curve represents
the achievable rates for a different set of parameters of the BOOT protocol.
rate for p = (1/2), ROT,m = 1/(2(m − 1)) reveals an
improvement in rate by a factor of ((m − 1)/(⌈log2m⌉)).
The BOOT protocol achieves higher rates since it effectively
recycles the erasures to conceal more bits. Some information
is leaked since the erasures are being recycled, however, only
joint functions of the strings (specifically the exclusive-or of
multiple strings) are revealed while maintaining the disjoint
privacy. Note that for the parameters u = 1 and s1 = m, the
BOOT protocol achieves the same rate as the SWOT protocol.
Thus, the BOOT protocol can achieve any rate achieved by
the SWOT protocol.
Figure 2 illustrates the achievable rates of the BOOT
protocol, with m = 10, as a function of erasure probability
p of the BES/BEC(p), for various sets of parameters. Note
that in different ranges, different sets of parameters are best.
The BOOT protocol for parameters {s1 = 10} (giving the
performance of the SWOT protocol) is best only in the range
of erasure probability close to p = (m− 1)/m and above.
V. SECURE FUNCTION COMPUTATION
The general secure function computation (GSFC) protocol
leverages the SWOT protocol. It uses two oblivious transfers,
where the first is from Alice to Bob and the second is from
Bob to Alice, reversing the roles. Since the SWOT protocol
uses a BES/BEC in the direction of the transfer, the GSFC
protocol uses a BES/BEC available in both directions. The rate
is determined as the ratio of function samples k to the total
number of BES/BEC samples used in both directions.
A. General SFC Protocol
This protocol is applicable to any general sources and func-
tions. Without loss of generality, let the finite source alphabets
be given by A = {1, . . . ,mA} and B = {1, . . . ,mB}, and
the ranges of the functions f and g be Rf = {0, 1}hA and
Rg = {0, 1}
hB respectively.
We outline the GSFC protocol with the following steps. For
Bob to compute Gk, Alice generates mB , khB-bit strings, for
i = 1, . . . ,mB , A˜
′
i = (g(A1, i), . . . , g(Ak, i)). Bob expands
his k source samples Bk to a vector of length khB, where each
element of Bk is repeated hB times to produce the samples
B′khB . Alice and Bob then use the SWOT protocol to perform
1-out-of-mB OT for khB-bit strings with {A˜′i}
mB
i=1 as Alice’s
strings, and Bob’s selections vector as B′khB . The result of
this OT gives Bob (g(A1, B1), . . . , g(Ak, Bk)). Similarly, for
Alice to compute F k, Alice and Bob reverse roles and perform
1-out-of-mA OT for khB-bit strings from Bob to Alice.
B. Analysis and Achievable Rates
The perfect privacy, negligible probability of error, and
distribution-free properties of SWOT protocol imply the same
properties in this secure function computation protocol. The
1-out-of-mB OT for khB-bit strings via the SWOT protocol
asymptotically requires n1 = khB/ROT,mB samples of a
BES/BEC from Alice to Bob, and likewise the other OT
requires n2 = khA/ROT,mA samples of a BES/BEC from
Bob to Alice, yielding the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1: Let mA = |A|, mB = |B|, hA =
⌈log2 |Rf |⌉, and hB = ⌈log2 |Rg |⌉. Then, the GSFC protocol,
utilizing correlated randomness in the form a BES/BEC(p)
available in both directions, is perfectly-private, distribution-
free and achieves the function computation rate
R =
(
hB
ROT,mA
+
hA
ROT,mB
)−1
,
where ROT,m = min((1 − p), p/(m − 1)) is the achievable
sample-wise OT rate from Theorem 3.1. The function compu-
tation capacity is bounded below by C ≥ R.
The GSFC protocol is general, but not optimal since it
does not exploit any source correlation or functional structure.
Note that only one usage of the SWOT is necessary if one of
the functions f, g is a function of (or the same as) the other
function.
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